[tor-bugs] #9206 [Tor]: 'Guard' flags only assigned to first nodes started in a private Tor network

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#9206: 'Guard' flags only assigned to first nodes started in a private Tor network
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 Reporter:  karsten                                |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect                                 |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  normal                                 |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Tor                                    |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-auth tor-relay simulation testing  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                                         |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by robgjansen):

 Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
 > What were you thinking for this easy implementation? Something else to
 go in the authorities' "approved-routers" files?

 I'm not familiar with the approved-routers files. If it means we would
 have something like a list of guards in a special file parsed by the
 authorities, the information in which they would use to assign guard
 flags, than that could work.

 Alternatively, is there anything wrong (I'm probably missing something
 here) with passing in a list of fingerprints/addresses/hostnames as a
 torrc config, where any node in this list will be brute-force-assigned the
 guard flag? (Testing only networks of course. Its easiest to work with
 hostnames in Shdow at the moment.) I guess this is a variation on the
 approved-routers list? Note that I'm selfishly looking for ease of
 configuration here, and torrc options have been the best (read: quickest)
 way to enable custom functionality quickly (I only have to compile once,
 and can then run several experiments with various settings).

 For the record, I'm not opposed to the history generation approach, but
 just thought the brute-force approach may be a quick fix for the time
 being.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9206#comment:6>
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