[tor-bugs] #7681 [Tor bundles/installation]: Wrap Tails inside a VM, where the outer VM runs Tor and handles the network

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#7681: Wrap Tails inside a VM, where the outer VM runs Tor and handles the network
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 Reporter:  arma                      |          Owner:       
     Type:  defect                    |         Status:  new  
 Priority:  normal                    |      Milestone:       
Component:  Tor bundles/installation  |        Version:       
 Keywords:                            |         Parent:  #7680
   Points:                            |   Actualpoints:       
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Comment(by ford):

 Sorry to take so long to follow up on this.  BTW, David Wolinsky
 <isaac.wolinsky at gmail.com>, the primary author of Winon, should probably
 be added to the CC list above but I can't see a way to do it myself
 (presumably because I'm not the owner of this trac item).

 anonym, I agree that USB-bootability and the VM-based structure are
 conceptually orthogonal though potentially complementary design features.
 Ideally we would like to be able to have either without the other: e.g., a
 USB-bootable Tails or similar distribution that can be run with the VM-
 based features on more powerful hardware or without on weaker hardware.
 Similarly, while running the VM-based browsing setup off a Tails USB stick
 might be the most secure in extreme situations, many users may also wish
 to run the anonymous-browser-in-a-VM config directly on top of their usual
 hard-disk-installed Linux (or other OS) distro, assuming they trust it's
 uncompromised.  We're working on incorporating some additional
 experimental features into the VM construction, such as a way to transfer
 files between anonymous and non-anonymous contexts via a "quarantine box"
 designed to help the user avoid giving away his/her anonymity, e.g., by
 detecting and optionally stripping EXIF data from JPEGs the user might
 want to post anonymously.

 So with these considerations in mind, perhaps the right kind of packaging
 model to work toward here would be for the browser-in-a-VM WiNon
 architecture to become (say) a more generic set of software and scripts
 that could be worked into both Tails and other more conventional
 distributions (e.g., Ubuntu) as appropriate package sets.  In the Tails
 case, there might eventually be some point during the startup process
 where the user has the opportunity to choose one of several "browsing
 modes/options", one of which could be a choice between the more powerful
 but expensive VM-based mode and the cheaper and more basic non-VM mode.  I
 understand it's likely that Tails will have to evolve to offer users other
 similar choices on startup as well, such as whether to try to connect to
 the Tor network "automagically" while risking giving away the fact that
 you're using Tor, or to hold off any attempt to connect until the user has
 a chance to choose a stego-bridge mode or something like that.

 In any case, WiNon is still a very early experimental research prototype,
 but we'll certainly keep in touch as it develops, and let's continue to
 explore the right way to transition whatever useful stuff comes out of it
 into a form that can be maintained in the long term.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7681#comment:5>
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