[tor-bugs] #8065 [Tor]: Bug: src/or/connection_edge.c:649: connection_ap_expire_beginning: Assertion circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sat Feb 23 14:08:20 UTC 2013


#8065: Bug: src/or/connection_edge.c:649: connection_ap_expire_beginning:
Assertion circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed
----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------
    Reporter:  cypherpunks  |       Owner:                    
        Type:  defect       |      Status:  closed            
    Priority:  major        |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
   Component:  Tor          |     Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.9-alpha
  Resolution:  fixed        |    Keywords:  tor-client        
      Parent:               |      Points:                    
Actualpoints:               |  
----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------

Comment(by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:12 mikeperry]:
 > Ok. In your case, the assert no longer happens because in 0.2.4.10-alpha
 we fixed the preceeding NULL by not sending path bias probes on
 NULL/closed channels, which is what you're inducing by changing gateways.
 >
 > I am wondering if there are other cases where we could hit this assert,
 though. Basically any time a stream attempt is made to a slow/unresponsive
 host where we then give up on the circuit and try to close it (or time it
 out) before detaching the stream, we could hit this.
 >
 > To be safe, we might want to expand this assert to allow
 CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING as well as
 CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT? I could imagine cases where circuits in
 both purposes might end up down this codepath. I'm surprised we haven't
 seen it before for CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT circs, actually.

 Hi mike,
 you may be interested in my reply to #8136 - the crash happened on
 0.2.4.10-alpha.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8065#comment:17>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list