[tor-bugs] #8113 [Tor]: Reinstate some fixes from 6e4a4002 (was: Typo at circuitbuild.c:2360)

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#8113: Reinstate some fixes from 6e4a4002
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
    Reporter:  sysrqb  |       Owner:          
        Type:  defect  |      Status:  reopened
    Priority:  minor   |   Milestone:          
   Component:  Tor     |     Version:          
  Resolution:          |    Keywords:          
      Parent:          |      Points:          
Actualpoints:          |  
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------

Comment(by sysrqb):

 I went through 6e4a4002 and I think I found all of the changes that were
 undone (which were only a handful). A few were carried over after
 refactoring. Hopefully this will save you some time.

 {{{
 diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
 index e3a9d59..0db3407 100644
 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
 +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
 @@ -2094,11 +2094,11 @@ pathbias_count_circs_in_states(entry_guard_t
 *guard,
                                path_state_t from,
                                path_state_t to)
  {
 -  circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist;
 +  circuit_t *circ;
    int open_circuits = 0;

 -  /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */
 -  for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) {
 +  /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt.
 */
 +  for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
      origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
      if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */
          circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */
 @@ -2113,8 +2113,8 @@ pathbias_count_circs_in_states(entry_guard_t *guard,
          ocirc->path_state <= to &&
          pathbias_should_count(ocirc) &&
          fast_memeq(guard->identity,
 -                ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest,
 -                DIGEST_LEN)) {
 +                   ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest,
 +                   DIGEST_LEN)) {
        log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found opened circuit %d in path_state %s",
                  ocirc->global_identifier,
                  pathbias_state_to_string(ocirc->path_state));
 @@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
            log_warn(LD_CIRC,
                   "Your Guard %s=%s is failing to carry an extremely large
 "
                   "amount of stream on its circuits. "
 -                 "To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, Tor has
 "
 +                 "To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has
 "
                   "disabled use of this guard. "
                   "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. "
                   "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld
 collapsed, "
 @@ -2357,7 +2357,7 @@ pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
                   "amount of circuits. "
                   "Most likely this means the Tor network is "
                   "overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against "
 -                 "you or the potentially the guard itself. "
 +                 "you or potentially the guard itself. "
                   "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. "
                   "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld
 collapsed, "
                   "and %ld timed out. "
 @@ -2440,9 +2440,10 @@ pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
  }

  /** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to
 - * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we
 should
 - * eliminate the guard.  Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0
 if the
 - * guard looks fine. */
 + * <b>guard</b>, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that
 + * we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good;
 + * return 0 if the guard looks fine.
 + */
  static int
  entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
  {
 }}}

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8113#comment:4>
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