[tor-bugs] Please remove me 5th request

James Asteriou ajim775 at icloud.com
Fri Dec 20 13:21:26 UTC 2013


I have asked via email and the unsubscribe section without success. Please stop all emails as this is the 5th attempt to stop these emails. 

Jim 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Dec 20, 2013, at 12:33 AM, tor-bugs-request at lists.torproject.org wrote:
> 
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> Today's Topics:
> 
>   1. Re: #2471 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Port to Firefox Mobile
>      (Fennec+Electrolysis) (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>   2. Re: #2471 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Port to Firefox Mobile
>      (Fennec+Electrolysis) (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>   3. #10445 [Tor]: New identity restarts browser
>      (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>   4. Re: #10400 [TorBrowserButton]: Provide "New Identity" option
>      that uses session restore (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>   5. Re: #10445 [TorBrowserButton]: New identity restarts    browser
>      (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>   6. Re: #5798 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Improve persistence and
>      WebFont compatibility of font patch (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>   7. Re: #5798 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Improve persistence and
>      WebFont compatibility of font patch (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>   8. Re: #8879 [Tor]: Tor's socks5 handshake with
>      username/password auth doesn't follow the protocol spec, and
>      pidgin notices (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>   9. Re: #10400 [TorBrowserButton]: Provide "New Identity" option
>      that uses session restore (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 01:53:26 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #2471 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Port to Firefox
>    Mobile (Fennec+Electrolysis)
> Message-ID: <064.fcf9f5782e77627141167565d0cf6c2c at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #2471: Port to Firefox Mobile (Fennec+Electrolysis)
> --------------------------------------+-----------------------
>     Reporter:  mikeperry             |      Owner:  mikeperry
>         Type:  enhancement           |     Status:  new
>     Priority:  normal                |  Milestone:
>    Component:  EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |    Version:
>   Resolution:                        |   Keywords:
> Actual Points:                        |  Parent ID:  #5709
>       Points:  6                     |
> --------------------------------------+-----------------------
> 
> Comment (by zyan):
> 
> Ha, Mozilla just told me that Fennec doesn't use e10's anymore. So this
> might just work. I asked them to try installing HTTPS Everywhere to see if
> it works because I'm lazy.
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2471#comment:19>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 2
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 02:14:56 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #2471 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Port to Firefox
>    Mobile (Fennec+Electrolysis)
> Message-ID: <064.0b312acbbc69eae7f9225382040cbd22 at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #2471: Port to Firefox Mobile (Fennec+Electrolysis)
> --------------------------------------+-----------------------
>     Reporter:  mikeperry             |      Owner:  mikeperry
>         Type:  enhancement           |     Status:  new
>     Priority:  normal                |  Milestone:
>    Component:  EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |    Version:
>   Resolution:                        |   Keywords:
> Actual Points:                        |  Parent ID:  #5709
>       Points:  6                     |
> --------------------------------------+-----------------------
> 
> Comment (by zyan):
> 
> Ok, I quickly tried installing HTTPS Everywhere stable with the new
> install.rdf in Android Firefox. It successfully redirected URLs but also
> apparently prevented pages from loading (even pages without rulesets).
> Will investigate more once I set up the Android SDK.
> 
> rumor has it that this android firefox thing doesn't use XUL.
> 
> -Yan
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2471#comment:20>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 3
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 02:21:37 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: [tor-bugs] #10445 [Tor]: New identity restarts browser
> Message-ID: <046.d0e703cff3d1ad3c6907a98548d98803 at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #10445: New identity restarts browser
> ----------------------+---------------------
> Reporter:  Butcer    |          Owner:
>     Type:  defect    |         Status:  new
> Priority:  critical  |      Milestone:
> Component:  Tor       |        Version:
> Keywords:            |  Actual Points:
> Parent ID:            |         Points:
> ----------------------+---------------------
> New identity restarts browser in 3.5 making it unusable
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10445>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 4
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 02:24:58 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #10400 [TorBrowserButton]: Provide "New
>    Identity" option that uses session restore
> Message-ID: <064.a0ce006710e9f97f0ae1943fe53a76cb at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #10400: Provide "New Identity" option that uses session restore
> ----------------------------------+---------------------------------------
>     Reporter:  mikeperry         |      Owner:  mikeperry
>         Type:  enhancement       |     Status:  new
>     Priority:  major             |  Milestone:
>    Component:  TorBrowserButton  |    Version:
>   Resolution:                    |   Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-newnym
> Actual Points:                    |  Parent ID:
>       Points:                    |
> ----------------------------------+---------------------------------------
> 
> Comment (by Butcer):
> 
> why not, if tor is supposed to be usuabul this is a feature you must have,
> else tor will go down and be yet another dead open source program
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10400#comment:6>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 5
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 04:41:17 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #10445 [TorBrowserButton]: New identity
>    restarts    browser
> Message-ID: <061.c3c06c25765bbc657716e080ee3413a9 at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #10445: New identity restarts browser
> ----------------------------------+------------------------
>     Reporter:  Butcer            |      Owner:
>         Type:  defect            |     Status:  closed
>     Priority:  normal            |  Milestone:
>    Component:  TorBrowserButton  |    Version:
>   Resolution:  duplicate         |   Keywords:  tbb-newnym
> Actual Points:                    |  Parent ID:
>       Points:                    |
> ----------------------------------+------------------------
> Changes (by arma):
> 
> * status:  new => closed
> * keywords:   => tbb-newnym
> * component:  Tor => TorBrowserButton
> * resolution:   => duplicate
> * priority:  critical => normal
> 
> 
> Comment:
> 
> I encourage you to look at the TBB 3.5 transition FAQ:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowserBundle3FAQ
> especially the question about new identity.
> 
> Closing as duplicate of #9906.
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10445#comment:1>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 6
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 04:49:39 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #5798 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Improve
>    persistence and WebFont compatibility of font patch
> Message-ID: <064.d07c49da3fb64a857119292a1c80af0d at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #5798: Improve persistence and WebFont compatibility of font patch
> -------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
>     Reporter:  mikeperry            |      Owner:  mikeperry
>         Type:  defect               |     Status:  new
>     Priority:  major                |  Milestone:
>    Component:  Firefox Patch        |    Version:
>  Issues                             |   Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,
>   Resolution:                       |  interview
> Actual Points:                       |  Parent ID:
>       Points:                       |
> -------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
> 
> Comment (by gacar):
> 
> It seems keeping font counts in nsPresContext allows a page to load
> unlimited number of fonts using multiple frames:
> 
> http://jsbin.com/uRidOyAg/1
> 
> I guess this is because each frame has it's own presentation context.
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5798#comment:13>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 7
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 05:00:57 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #5798 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Improve
>    persistence and WebFont compatibility of font patch
> Message-ID: <064.9af7acfacb9a3984c46727143c7233ac at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #5798: Improve persistence and WebFont compatibility of font patch
> -------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
>     Reporter:  mikeperry            |      Owner:  mikeperry
>         Type:  defect               |     Status:  new
>     Priority:  major                |  Milestone:
>    Component:  Firefox Patch        |    Version:
>  Issues                             |   Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,
>   Resolution:                       |  interview, tbb-testcase
> Actual Points:                       |  Parent ID:
>       Points:                       |
> -------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
> Changes (by mikeperry):
> 
> * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, interview => tbb-fingerprinting,
>     interview, tbb-testcase
> 
> 
> Comment:
> 
> Sweet. A test case.
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5798#comment:14>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 8
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 05:04:48 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #8879 [Tor]: Tor's socks5 handshake with
>    username/password auth doesn't follow the protocol spec, and pidgin
>    notices
> Message-ID: <059.2f0ff8a08d1c518a72b1cc6bd4c66b3f at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #8879: Tor's socks5 handshake with username/password auth doesn't follow the
> protocol spec, and pidgin notices
> ------------------------+--------------------------------
>     Reporter:  arma    |      Owner:
>         Type:  defect  |     Status:  needs_review
>     Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
>    Component:  Tor     |    Version:
>   Resolution:          |   Keywords:  tor-client
> Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
>       Points:          |
> ------------------------+--------------------------------
> 
> Comment (by arma):
> 
> I also lean towards don't merge.
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8879#comment:15>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 9
> Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 05:33:07 -0000
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole at torproject.org>
> Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #10400 [TorBrowserButton]: Provide "New
>    Identity" option that uses session restore
> Message-ID: <064.faa74703336efe0a65abca347a05f00a at torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> #10400: Provide "New Identity" option that uses session restore
> ----------------------------------+---------------------------------------
>     Reporter:  mikeperry         |      Owner:  mikeperry
>         Type:  enhancement       |     Status:  new
>     Priority:  major             |  Milestone:
>    Component:  TorBrowserButton  |    Version:
>   Resolution:                    |   Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-newnym
> Actual Points:                    |  Parent ID:
>       Points:                    |
> ----------------------------------+---------------------------------------
> 
> Comment (by mikeperry):
> 
> Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
>> Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
>>> Replying to [ticket:10400 mikeperry]:
>>>> People routinely request a New Identity option that doesn't close
> all of their tabs. Unfortunately, this is not really possible to implement
> while still clearing all of the tracking-related browser state.
>>> 
>>> What blockers do you have in mind if one tries to take that road?
>> 
>> After thinking a while about it I suppose I should be more precise with
> my question: What issues do you have in mind that are solvable by the
> session restore approach but not by leaving tabs open after clearing
> tracking-related browser state?
> 
> The session restore approach defends against invisible tracking. If we
> left tabs live and fully open while clearing the cache, cookies, HTTP
> auth, etc, then javascript and other dynamic elements (CSS) are still
> present and still have access to any dynamically generated identifiers,
> and these identifiers will easily find their way back into the cache, and
> have a number of other vectors to embed persistent tracking identifiers
> that are invisible to the user.
> 
> In theory, adversaries could encode identifiers in the first party urls
> stored in the session store. However, if we only allow url bar urls to be
> stored (and no cache, DOM storage, etc), then such tracking is at least
> limited to what is visible, and only to first party tracking (and
> hopefully that will be rare, due to its visibility and cumbersome nature).
> 
> --
> Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10400#comment:7>
> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
> The Tor Project: anonymity online
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
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> 
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