[tor-bugs] #10429 [Flashproxy]: Test multiple flashproxy Bridge lines

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Dec 18 16:57:18 UTC 2013


#10429: Test multiple flashproxy Bridge lines
-------------------------+---------------------
 Reporter:  dcf          |          Owner:  dcf
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:
Component:  Flashproxy   |        Version:
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
-------------------------+---------------------
 Flash proxy bridge configuration looks like this:
 {{{
 Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:1
 }}}
 To Tor it looks like a single bridge, even though there are multiple
 (5–10) browser proxies behind it. Only one of these is in use at a time,
 while the others sit idle waiting for the first to die. It is a dummy
 address because we don't know the address of our browser proxy until we
 receive a connection.

 comment:14:ticket:7153 would be the ideal situation, where flashproxy-
 client dynamically informs Tor of what actual browser are available,
 adding them and removing them as needed. But failing that, we should try a
 configuration like
 {{{
 Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:1
 Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:2
 Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:3
 Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:4
 Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:5
 }}}
 That is, multiple distinct dummy addresses. There will still be an unknown
 number of real browser proxies behind them, but Tor will be more aware
 that there is actually more than one proxy in use. If one of them happens
 to be slow, it can try another one, which will be connected to a different
 browser. It may allow us to get rid of the [comment:4:ticket:10418
 "LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0" workaround] and actually usefully exclude the
 slowest browser proxies.

 The scheme was previously suggested in comment:5:ticket:7153.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10429>
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