[tor-bugs] #9498 [Tor]: Allow bridge descriptors to contain no address if they are not being published

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Aug 29 15:36:27 UTC 2013


#9498: Allow bridge descriptors to contain no address if they are not being
published
-----------------------------+-------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  nwf          |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:  Tor: unspecified
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-bridge,need-spec,bridgedb
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Comment (by atagar):

 > I am worried also that private bridges creating falsified descriptors
 will break things, since BridgeDB, as well as anything else which parses
 descriptors looking for addresses -- such as (probably) metrics-tasks,
 stem, and arm, would need to be changed to understand this.

 * Arm does not presently use bridge descriptors (it only uses general
 descriptor information available through the controller interface).

 * Wiping the address would prevent metrics from producing the sanaitized
 addresses in the [https://metrics.torproject.org/formats.html#bridgedesc
 bridge format it publishes]. I suspect for Karsten's purposes he would
 like the address to be something unique (not blanked to 0.0.0.0), though
 it probably fine for it to be inaccurate. You should double check with
 him.

 * For stem's part I
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/blob/HEAD:/stem/descriptor/server_descriptor.py#l885
 validate that bridges have been scrubbed] according to Karsten's spec, but
 that's about all I would need to update.

 If you do write a spec for this please be clearer about the reason for it.
 When I first read the ticket I thought "Huh? Clients already need the
 address to get unpublished bridges so what's the purpose of scrubbing the
 address we respond with?" but then I remembered flash proxies and the
 other fancy schemes you folks have been coming up with. :)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9498#comment:4>
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