[tor-bugs] #9546 [Tor]: Link handshake fails with "Received unexpected cell command 10" on a bridge

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sat Aug 24 01:01:20 UTC 2013


#9546: Link handshake fails with "Received unexpected cell command 10" on a bridge
------------------------------------------------+---------------------------
 Reporter:  zwol                                |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect                              |         Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  major                               |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Tor                                 |        Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.15-rc  
 Keywords:  tor-bridge tor-client 023-backport  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                                      |   Actualpoints:                    
------------------------------------------------+---------------------------

Comment(by arma):

 Patches look fine otherwise. I admit I am nervous putting them into 0.2.3,
 since the v3 link handshake is complex.

 But then, I'm nervous about not putting them into 0.2.3 also.

 I guess the downside of doing it is that we could screw up our stable. And
 the downside of not is that 0.2.3 bridges would need either an 0.2.2.x or
 an 0.2.4.17+ relay for their reachability test.

 And there are other impacts to ponder, like whether this changes the "i
 can talk to it and distinguish whether it's a bridge" attacks. My first
 thought there is that such attacks are possible both before and after this
 patch, and having some patched bridges and some unpatched bridges won't
 change things much.

 I guess that means "merge the 0.2.4 version, and keep this in mind for an
 0.2.3 version if we ever do one"? Or "merge them both and expect we'll
 test it well enough before we make a new 0.2.3 version anyway"?

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9546#comment:28>
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