[tor-bugs] #5968 [Tor]: Improve onion key and TLS management

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#5968: Improve onion key and TLS management
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 Reporter:  mikeperry    |          Owner:                    
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  major        |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-relay    |         Parent:  #5456             
   Points:               |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by nickm):

 If the attacker can steal the identity key for a server, they could
 publish their own descriptors to the authorities, containing their own TLS
 cert hash and IP.  The server operator might notice, but the users
 wouldn't.

 Sticking this int the _micro_descriptors seems pretty heavyweight.  Maybe
 I don't understand the attack, though.  If the attacker can steal the
 identity key for a server, it seems to me that they could also steal the
 onion key, replace the server's Tor software, trojan the server in some
 other way, publish descriptors with a different onion key, and so on.  I
 don't think that "identity key compromise" is something that a server can
 really recover from in our design.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5968#comment:7>
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