[tor-bugs] #6937 [Tor Client]: SocksPipe or SocksSocket - an anonymous pipe to smoke network leakings bug out (of)
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
torproject-admin at torproject.org
Sun Sep 23 09:01:24 UTC 2012
#6937: SocksPipe or SocksSocket - an anonymous pipe to smoke network leakings bug
out (of)
-------------------------------------+--------------------------------------
Reporter: ioerror | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version: Tor: unspecified
Keywords: security needs-proposal | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
-------------------------------------+--------------------------------------
Comment(by ioerror):
I'll open another ticket about a related idea and I'll also describe it
here first. Regardless of what we use as the Application -> Tor transport,
we want a way for Applications, including *other* Tor clients on the
system, to know that Tor is running and how to reach it. It seems that we
could solve a lot of file system permissions by creating a globally shared
segment of memory, filling it with information on ways to reach Tor and
letting each application pick the most reasonable method for connections.
It seems reasonable to do this with shm_open - regardless of what we stuff
inside. We could at least then easily-configure all apps to understand
that they should look for a running Tor with shm_open() - we just need to
pick a name, such as 'tor-shim' and then stick with it. In this sense, any
application could launch a tor and all other applications could find it
and use it *but* they wouldn't need to launch a reasonable Tor was already
running. shmget, shm_open and others all seem reasonably straight forward
on GNU/Linux and CreateSharedMemory is the Win32 cousin.
Tor could have/use this default shred mutex to create or read from at
startup.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6937#comment:15>
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