[tor-bugs] #7141 [Censorship analysis]: How is Pars Online blocking Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7141: How is Pars Online blocking Tor?
------------------------------------------+---------------------------------
 Reporter:  phw                           |          Owner:  phw
     Type:  task                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal                        |      Milestone:     
Component:  Censorship analysis           |        Version:     
 Keywords:  dpi, censorship, block, iran  |         Parent:     
   Points:                                |   Actualpoints:     
------------------------------------------+---------------------------------

Comment(by cda):

 After several attempts to investigate this issue, I am unable to reproduce
 this ticket currently. I would suggest that there is a significant need
 for more detailed information on what part of the Pars network these
 reports are coming from and what the user experiences.

 '''Is this type of block limited to Pars Online?'''

 I was able to bootstrap a clean installation of Tor from within Iran
 yesterday. While I have been led to believe from discussions and
 historical examples that most DPI occurs at AS12880, the international
 gateway, it does appear evident from recent government RFQs that they are
 interested in moving this administration to the ISP level. I have now
 arranged a server with Pars and am attempting to reproduce -- without luck
 so far.

 Three notes:

 * There is no significant change in the number of users directly
 connecting from Iran under metrics[1]. ParsOnline is something akin to the
 Comcast of Iran, and disruptions in the connectivity would be fairly
 evident.
 * There have been a few number of complaints regarding HTTPS disruption on
 social media and elsewhere since the unblocking of Google, but these have
 been hard to pin down and nonspecific to Tor.
 * If there is active probing, we should setup a bridge with a FQDN,
 trigger a probe and watch for connections.
 * It would be useful to clarify the manner of the disruption the user is
 experiencing: are they able to stay connected to a bridge for a limited
 amount of time or unable to create a circuit at all? In the China example
 wasn't there queuing on probes and thus a few minutes of access?

 I'm certainly not dismissing the ticket, it's just difficult find data at
 this moment.

 [1] https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-
 users&start=2012-10-04&end=2012-10-20&country=ir&events=points&dpi=72
 #direct-users

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7141#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online