[tor-bugs] #7277 [Tor]: timestamp leaked in TLS client hello

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7277: timestamp leaked in TLS client hello
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  proper      |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  normal      |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Tor         |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-client  |         Parent:                    
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:                    
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------

Comment(by asn):

 Sounds good. I guess the next step to figure out is whether we can do
 callback hacks to play with OpenSSL's `ssl3_state_st.client_random` at the
 correct time.

 Maybe another long-term step would be to write a #5488-like proposal in an
 attempt to persuade implementations and IETF to stop putting their
 timestamps inside `{Client,Server}Hello.random`? Why does it happen
 anyway? The reasos is not explained in RFC5246.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7277#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online