[tor-bugs] #5791 [Tor bundles/installation]: Gather apparmor/selinux/sandbox instructions for each component of TBB

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Thu May 24 05:52:41 UTC 2012


#5791: Gather apparmor/selinux/sandbox instructions for each component of TBB
--------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma                      |          Owner:  cypherpunks             
     Type:  project                   |         Status:  assigned                
 Priority:  normal                    |      Milestone:  Sponsor Z: March 1, 2013
Component:  Tor bundles/installation  |        Version:                          
 Keywords:                            |         Parent:  #4522                   
   Points:                            |   Actualpoints:                          
--------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Changes (by mikeperry):

  * owner:  => cypherpunks
  * status:  new => assigned
  * parent:  => #4522


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 trams]:
 > Note that one of the bigger issues with going apparmor/selinux is that
 there is no way for the application to "opt-in" for the extra protection.
 The user needs to load a profile or a module to get it contained. This
 requires root privileges on the system.

 Actually now that I think about it, isn't stuff like this what PAM was
 designed for? Can't ./start-tor-browser just ask for root authentication
 to temporarily enable either an SELinux module or AppArmor profile? I know
 on Mac OS this definitely is the case (but most likely Mac won't require
 root to load Seatbelt profiles, I assume).

 Assuming, of course, that the kernel itself doesn't write a record to disk
 of the profile being loaded... Though even if it does, we could just warn
 the user of that fact.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5791#comment:16>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list