[tor-bugs] #5460 [Tor Client]: Write proposal(s) to evaluate circuit crypto authentication

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#5460: Write proposal(s) to evaluate circuit crypto authentication
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 Reporter:  mikeperry   |          Owner:  nickm             
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  assigned          
 Priority:  major       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Tor Client  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:              |         Parent:  #5456             
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:4 mikeperry]:
 > Ondrej pointed out that I2P's one-RTT circuit construction is very
 useful for avoiding disclosing the length of your circuit. It might also
 be useful for avoiding the per-hop MACs we'd need here.

 Mike, Marsh, and I just discussed this a little on IRC.  The tricky thing
 here is that there aren't a lot of ways to do one-RTT circuit construction
 and retain PFS--especially PFS for your path itself!-- unless you're
 getting your PFS from key rotation.

 We should go through Kate and Goldberg's paper to see if it shows (or
 cites!) something we could use, but it's not obvious to me that it's a
 great idea right now.

 (Also, circuit creation is ''not'' what this ticket is about: this ticket
 is about handling relay cells once circuits are established.)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5460#comment:8>
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