[tor-bugs] #5753 [Analysis]: When we isolate streams by domain, can a local observer guess how many domains we visit?

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#5753: When we isolate streams by domain, can a local observer guess how many
domains we visit?
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 Reporter:  arma      |          Owner:       
     Type:  defect    |         Status:  new  
 Priority:  normal    |      Milestone:       
Component:  Analysis  |        Version:       
 Keywords:            |         Parent:  #5752
   Points:            |   Actualpoints:       
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Comment(by mikeperry):

 This might be an interesting math problem to academics, but when compared
 to the linkability at the exit node that can be used to totally
 deanonymize you (for example, by issuing a subpoena to mail.google.com
 and/or the equivalent iranian state run email provider to find out who
 runs a twitter account accessed on the same circuit), it pales in
 comparison.

 Also, remember there's a 33% chance you'll use the same guard, even if you
 don't use the same circuit. So 1/3 of your website visits will be no
 different than the status quo anyways.

 Further, the status quo is that local observers can probably simply
 observe network activity vs silence to determine your domain visits, since
 most humans navigate web pages relatively slowly compared to 3rd party
 content sourcing rates.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5753#comment:2>
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The Tor Project: anonymity online