[tor-bugs] #5028 [Ooni]: Tor bridge scanning

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Fri Mar 9 09:24:05 UTC 2012


#5028: Tor bridge scanning
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 Reporter:  hellais  |          Owner:  runa                     
     Type:  project  |         Status:  assigned                 
 Priority:  normal   |      Milestone:  Sponsor F: March 15, 2012
Component:  Ooni     |        Version:                           
 Keywords:           |         Parent:                           
   Points:           |   Actualpoints:                           
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Comment(by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:21 asn]:
 > A TCP scan on a bridge from .kz would return a false positive, since the
 bridge actually gets blocked real-time on the SSL layer.

 Let's not scan from .kz then.

 > An SSL scan on a bridge from .cn would return a false positive, since
 the bridge would get active-scanned and blocked afterwards.

 But a TCP scan from .cn should work fine, right?

 > From discussing this with hellais the past few days, I think this ticket
 needs some more thought poured into it. Specifically, I think that the
 purpose of this project, the scanning method, and the subset of bridges
 to-be scanned could be specified better, before scanning all the bridges
 from a single computer in a censored country.

 More thinking sounds fine.  We have 6 days---for more thinking and for
 getting actual results.  My intuition is that we should be done with
 thinking about this project by now.  Heck, we should be done doing stuff
 and only writing down results by now.

 > Also, scanning of unpublished bridges should be of interest too.

 We could scan bridges in the reserved pool, which are sorta unpublished.
 Let's save that for after March 15 though.

 > Also, I think that one of the main questions of this project should be
 "What common characteristics do the blocked bridges share, and why are the
 non-blocked bridges non-blocked?"

 Sure.  That's part of the analysis that we should do once we have actual
 results.

 > PS: sorry for raiding the ticket

 No worries.  It was a feeble attempt anyway. ;)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5028#comment:22>
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