[tor-bugs] #5979 [Tor Hidden Services]: Tor hidden services can be censored with (D)DoS attacks

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#5979: Tor hidden services can be censored with (D)DoS attacks
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 Reporter:  cypherpunks          |          Owner:     
     Type:  defect               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal               |      Milestone:     
Component:  Tor Hidden Services  |        Version:     
 Keywords:                       |         Parent:     
   Points:                       |   Actualpoints:     
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Changes (by arma):

  * priority:  blocker => normal
  * component:  Tor Client => Tor Hidden Services


Comment:

 When you say 'blocker', what do you suggest that it block?

 This is not a 'bug' so much as a missing design. There are two phases to
 fixing it.

 First, the easier one, is to look at the various parameters we've picked
 (how many intro points, how many requests allowed, what sort of timeout,
 etc etc) and see if they're good parameters in practice. Probably most of
 them aren't. Then see if they should adapt under attack (and also consider
 messy things like anonymity effects of adapting under attack). I suggest
 getting your Tor network running under Shadow or ExperimenTor to get a
 good handle on the big picture.

 The second phase is to take a step back and see if better designs would
 provide better resistance to attack.

 You may find http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#valet:pet2006 or
 http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#overlier-pet2007 or
 http://petsymposium.org/2008/hotpets/vrtprsvc.pdf useful in phase two. See
 in particular the designs where the introduction point ignores your cell
 if you don't provide the right authentication.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5979#comment:4>
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