[tor-bugs] #6180 [Ooni]: Detecting censorship in HTTP pages

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#6180: Detecting censorship in HTTP pages
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 Reporter:  hellais  |          Owner:  hellais             
     Type:  task     |         Status:  needs_review        
 Priority:  normal   |      Milestone:  Sponsor H: June 2012
Component:  Ooni     |        Version:                      
 Keywords:           |         Parent:                      
   Points:           |   Actualpoints:                      
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Changes (by isis):

  * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 If we are packaging Tor, then could we simply tell the OONI copy of Tor to
 AllowDotExit notation and always direct it at the same reliable exit node
 for a given portion of the test? Or, specify only those reliable nodes in
 a given region? This does obviously increase fingerprintability and
 potentially even an attack surface.

 Another workaround to the geolocation problem might be limiting the test
 to only request non-geolocalized pages, i.e. not google.com or
 facebook.com or whatever. There are plenty of vanilla static webpages out
 there, we'd just have to be sure that as OONI grows we don't hammer them,
 and also not to pick ones that are so obscure that we're essentially
 publishing to that server which users run OONI tests.

 As for your last suggestion, we could use the HTTP fuzzy match algorithm
 from the captive portal test, which is not yet ported to the new Twisted-
 based framework, but is in it's old version in the captive portal branch
 of my OONI repo on github. That algorithm could definitely use some
 smarts, however.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6180#comment:1>
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