[tor-bugs] #4957 [Metrics Data Processor]: Decide how to sanitize pluggable transport lines in bridge descriptors

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Wed Jan 25 06:51:22 UTC 2012


#4957: Decide how to sanitize pluggable transport lines in bridge descriptors
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 Reporter:  karsten                 |          Owner:  karsten
     Type:  task                    |         Status:  new    
 Priority:  normal                  |      Milestone:         
Component:  Metrics Data Processor  |        Version:         
 Keywords:                          |         Parent:         
   Points:                          |   Actualpoints:         
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 We're providing [https://metrics.torproject.org/formats.html#bridgedesc
 sanitized versions] of bridge descriptors in almost real-time on the
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html#bridgedesc metrics website] and
 via rsync.

 Once we enable bridges to include pluggable transport information in their
 server and/or extra-info descriptors, we need to come up with a way to
 sanitize the sensitive parts.  We'll want to remove any keys contained in
 pluggable transport lines, okay.  But maybe the fact that a bridge offers
 a specific pluggable transport is already sensitive?  Maybe the fact that
 it offers ''any'' pluggable transport is sensitive?

 This problem came up in #3589.  Bridge clients aren't supposed to learn
 about pluggable transports contained in the bridge's extra-info
 descriptor.  Neither the bridge authority nor the bridge gives out extra-
 info descriptors.  But once the client knows the bridge's server
 descriptor it can easily look up the ''sanitized'' extra-info descriptor
 from the metrics archives.  If we don't want the client to learn about the
 bridge's transports, we need to take that into account.  If it helps, we
 can define new sanitizing rules for each pluggable transport there is.

 So, there's a trade-off between revealing too much information and being
 able to analyze pluggable transport deployment.  We'll probably want to
 run some analyses on pluggable transport deployment.  We can only do that
 if the information is contained in the sanitized versions of bridge
 descriptors (because we don't use the original descriptors for analysis at
 all).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4957>
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