[tor-bugs] #7157 [Tor]: "Low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s."

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Dec 18 22:35:01 UTC 2012


#7157: "Low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s."
-----------------------------------------+----------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma                         |          Owner:                    
     Type:  enhancement                  |         Status:  needs_revision    
 Priority:  normal                       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Tor                          |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-client, MikePerry201212  |         Parent:  #5456             
   Points:                               |   Actualpoints:  19                
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Comment(by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:25 mikeperry]:
 > Ok, I pushed the changes for review 2. I'll also write up the three
 major changes from the proposal to tor-dev (the two you mentioned +
 #7691).

 Great; thank you.

 > I did not do anything with timestamp_dirty yet. I'm pretty sure we want
 to keep at least the hidserv timestamp_dirty additions.. Do you just want
 me to move the timestamp_dirty change to the cannibalization code? It does
 appear like that might make us decide against re-cannibalizing it, and may
 impact our use of cannibalized circuits under predictive building
 conditions + new identity.. hrmm...

 At this point, I think whichever option is simplest would be best here.
 This is tricky stuff, and at least your existing code is tested... but if
 it breaks functionality we care about, we need to think of the simplest
 fix there. Regressions are teh suxx0r.

 > If you want me to switch to another path_state_t flag, I can do that,
 but it's a bit more changes+refactoring.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7157#comment:26>
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