[tor-bugs] #7202 [Tor]: Implement ntor handshake or its successor

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#7202: Implement ntor handshake or its successor
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 Reporter:  karsten             |          Owner:                    
     Type:  project             |         Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  normal              |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Tor                 |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  SponsorZ tor-relay  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                      |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:17 mikeperry]:
 > Ok, I think I've finished looking over the unit test in comparison to
 the original paper. I think it all matches up now (aside from the dirauth
 checking issue), but I have one nagging, basic question: Why do we
 separately compute s.verify anymore now that we use rfc5869_sha256() to
 derive our key material? Couldn't s.secret_input go directly into the Hmac
 step and save us the verify hash, or is there additional future-proofing
 against hash weaknesses hidden in this step?

 I believe it's meant to be future-proofing against hash weaknesses, bad
 kdfs, or stuff like that.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7202#comment:19>
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