[tor-bugs] #7157 [Tor]: "Low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s."

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#7157: "Low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s."
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 Reporter:  arma                         |          Owner:                    
     Type:  enhancement                  |         Status:  needs_revision    
 Priority:  normal                       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Tor                          |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-client, MikePerry201212  |         Parent:  #5456             
   Points:                               |   Actualpoints:  19                
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Changes (by nickm):

  * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Okay, part two (which covers the rest of the branch up to
 ccaeef22e168af34e9b6a63d65ce17e58dd702e2) is much shorter:

 Documentation on pathbias_check_close seems inadequate; it should
 really say what the function actually DOES.  It happily calls
 pathbias_count_successful_close.


 Setting timestamp_dirty in circuit_extend_to_new_exit seems wrong.
 The circuit *isn't* dirty!  Maybe overloading timestamp_dirty in this
 way, rather than grabbing a new bit, is a mistake?


 04866055e8dadc9eb5b09773 freaks me out.  This feels like a significant
 redesign of the whole concept, and I didn't see it mentioned on
 tor-dev anywhere or on the tickets.  "As long as end-to-end tagging is
 possible, we assume the adversary will use it over hop-to-hop
 failure"?  Is there any discussion of this anyplace?  (The idea here
 seems to be that entry nodes are allowed to filter for the second hop
 as much as they like, and the pathbias code won't care, but that if
 they start tagging/filtering for the third hop or later, they need to
 be called out. Is that right?)


 In general: use %f to printf a double, but %lf to scanf a double.  At
 least one compiler we care about complains when it sees %lf in a
 printf format string.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7157#comment:18>
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