[tor-bugs] #6710 [Tor Relay]: Tor Relays accept arbitrary destination address and port and leak information about reachability

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Mon Aug 27 15:41:21 UTC 2012


#6710: Tor Relays accept arbitrary destination address and port and leak
information about reachability
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  thejh      |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect     |         Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  major      |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Relay  |        Version:  Tor: unspecified  
 Keywords:             |         Parent:                    
   Points:             |   Actualpoints:                    
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [ticket:6710 thejh]:

 > Usage: Configure the target relay as bridge, set loglevel to notice and
 run the modified tor client with some IP and port in the bridges network
 as last two parameters (for some reason, it seems like the IP has to be in
 backwards notation... don't ask me why).

 You left out a call to `htonl`.

 > Example:
 > $ src/or/tor -f torrc 1.178.168.192 80
 > [...]
 > Aug 27 10:30:34.000 [notice] CREATING SPOOFED CIRCUIT
 > Aug 27 10:30:34.000 [notice] CIRCUIT WAS DESTROYED
 >
 > $ src/or/tor -f torrc 2.178.168.192 80
 > [...]
 > Aug 27 10:30:00.000 [notice] CREATING SPOOFED CIRCUIT
 > Aug 27 10:30:03.000 [notice] CIRCUIT WAS DESTROYED
 >
 > 192.168.178.1 is up, 192.168.178.2 is down. As you can see, the response
 time reflects this.

 You don't need to guess what the response time means.  Relays send an
 explicit indication of why they failed to extend a circuit, although the
 client code loses this information fairly soon after receiving it.  See
 also #3520 and #2576.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6710#comment:2>
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