[tor-bugs] #6683 [Tor Relay]: Request: add offset to current system time

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Sun Aug 26 23:41:35 UTC 2012


#6683: Request: add offset to current system time
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  tmpname0901  |          Owner:                  
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  needs_revision  
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Tor Relay    |        Version:                  
 Keywords:               |         Parent:                  
   Points:               |   Actualpoints:                  
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:9 rransom]:
 > Which is one reason that I told you to use a static global variable
 which the configuration-loading code would set.  (Another reason is that
 it would suck if your function/macro were ever called before Tor had
 loaded its configuration (i.e. with `get_options() == NULL`).)

 In particular:

  * Define the global variable somewhere (in the same file as `tor_time`,
 before it, preferably near it):
 {{{
 static int time_offset = 0;
 }}}
  * Add a function to set that variable:
 {{{
 void
 tor_set_time_offset(int new_offset)
 {
   time_offset = new_offset;
   /* XXXX Maybe a cached time needs to be updated here. */
 }
 }}}
  * Call `tor_set_time_offset` when Tor's configuration is changed.
  * Use `tor_time` '''everywhere''', not just after Tor has loaded its
 configuration once.  (Tor will use a time offset of 0 until it is set;
 after that, Tor will use the same time offset everywhere, not just in code
 that you didn't see run (and crash) before Tor loaded its configuration.)
  * Make sure you have configured Tor with the --enable-gcc-warnings
 option.
  * Run ‘make check-spaces’ (semi-optional).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6683#comment:10>
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