[tor-bugs] #4361 [Tor Client]: Shouldn't the v3 client process the certs cell before sending her netinfo cell?

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#4361: Shouldn't the v3 client process the certs cell before sending her netinfo
cell?
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma        |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  normal      |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Client  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:              |         Parent:                    
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:                    
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 The tor-spec used to say:
 {{{
    As soon as it gets the CERTS cell, the initiator knows
    whether the responder is correctly authenticated.  At this point the
    initiator may send a NETINFO cell if it does not wish to
    authenticate, or a CERTS cell, an AUTHENTICATE cell (4.4), and a
 NETINFO
    cell if it does.
 }}}

 I changed it to:
 {{{
    The initiator can use the CERTS cell to confirm whether
    the responder is correctly authenticated. If the initiator does not
 wish
    to authenticate, it can send a NETINFO cell once it has received the
    VERSIONS cell from the responder. If the initiator does wish to
    authenticate, it waits until it gets the AUTH_CHALLENGE cell, and then
    sends a CERTS cell, an AUTHENTICATE cell (4.4), and a NETINFO
    cell.
 }}}
 since that's what the code does.

 But troll_un points out that we should probably change the code so the
 client checks the CERTS cell and either hangs up then, or sends her
 NETINFO comfortable in the knowledge that she knows who she's sending the
 NETINFO cell to.

 If we do change the code, we'd then want to revert (and probably still
 clean up a bit more) the spec change.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4361>
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