[tor-bugs] #3261 [Analysis]: Analyze how wrong our bridge usage statistics are

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Sun Oct 9 00:49:37 UTC 2011


#3261: Analyze how wrong our bridge usage statistics are
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 Reporter:  karsten   |          Owner:     
     Type:  task      |         Status:  new
 Priority:  major     |      Milestone:     
Component:  Analysis  |        Version:     
 Keywords:            |         Parent:     
   Points:            |   Actualpoints:     
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Comment(by arma):

 Replying to [comment:2 karsten]:
 >  More precisely, I looked at the fraction of relayed bytes per day that
 is covered by bridge statistics.  In theory, this fraction should roughly
 correspond to the fraction of bridge users being included in our bridge
 statistics.

 Assuming most bridge users find out about a bridge via one of the bridgedb
 mechanisms, I think we should look at 'fraction of bridges' as the primary
 question rather than 'fraction of bytes'. Bridgedb doesn't look at
 capacity after all when deciding what addresses to give out.

 So I would ask "Given this hour's networkstatus (written by Tonga), what
 fraction of the Running bridges never send us stats covering this hour?"

 (Treating load as uniform across bridges is the wrong thing to do for
 users who learn their bridge through a non-bridgedb mechanism, like
 hearing from a friend what bridge they use. I wonder how we can estimate
 what fraction of bridge users learn about their bridge in what way. We
 could say that there probably aren't many such users because it involves
 manual interaction; or we could say that there aren't many users of the
 bridgedb approach because it gives out bridges that don't work in China so
 they're moot. I'm inclined toward the former.)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3261#comment:3>
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