[tor-bugs] #4583 [Tor Bridge]: Implement certificate start time fuzzing (part of proposal 179)

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#4583: Implement certificate start time fuzzing (part of proposal 179)
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 Reporter:  asn         |          Owner:       
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  new  
 Priority:  normal      |      Milestone:       
Component:  Tor Bridge  |        Version:       
 Keywords:              |         Parent:  #3972
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:       
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 Implement fuzzing of the certificate's 'notBefore' field, so that it's not
 so apparent that we are creating new certs every 2 hours.

 Jake's code generated an 18-bits random number and substracted it from
 time(NULL). This approach fuzzes 'notBefore' for a maximum of  72 hours
 approx.

 Do we like it? Should we increase it? Should we decrease it? Is there
 anything we should be careful with, when increasing/decreasing the fuzzing
 factor?

 Since our new advertised MAX_SSL_LIFETIME is 1 year, I would incerase the
 fuzzing factor, even allowing our maximum fuzzing to be a month or so.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4583>
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