[tor-bugs] #3786 [Tor Relay]: Make clients and bridges use their IPv6 address

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Sat Nov 12 15:41:36 UTC 2011


#3786: Make clients and bridges use their IPv6 address
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  ln5        |          Owner:  ln5               
     Type:  task       |         Status:  accepted          
 Priority:  normal     |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Relay  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:             |         Parent:  #3563             
   Points:             |   Actualpoints:                    
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
Changes (by ln5):

 * cc: nickm (added)
  * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 Branch bug3786 in git.tpo/linus/tor.git now contains enough to make a
 client successfully use a bridge over IPv6.  Client in my tests was on
 FreeBSD and the bridge was on Ubuntu.

 The least clean part of this is probably the way both clients and
 bridges select between the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of a bridge.  This
 is written with the assumption that we will have a configuration
 option PreferIPv6 which makes both clients and bridges prefer an IPv6
 address if it's set.

 This is probably not the right way to do this though.  I do think that
 we want a PreferIPv6 option but it shouldn't be used in all places
 bug3786 does right now.

 Clients should do what arma suggested in #tor-dev and "scribble on a
 descriptor" which address to prefer.  This can be based on a config
 option or something else, depending on context.

 Bridges should not make use of that option at all, I think.  In
 bug3786 it's used for router_get_advertised_or_port() and
 tor_check_port_forwarding().  It's unclear to me how we should deal
 with these issues.  I'd love to see them addressed in #3785.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3786#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list