[tor-bugs] #4390 [Tor Bridge]: The rotation of the TLS context can act as a fingerprint for bridges
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Sat Nov 5 00:46:14 UTC 2011
#4390: The rotation of the TLS context can act as a fingerprint for bridges
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor Bridge | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Censors can monitor the traffic of a suspected bridge every
MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL and see if the TLS certificate has changed.
Normal SSL services don't change certificates every 2 hours.
Maybe we should consider increasing MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL.
Maybe we should consider implementing and documenting it as part of
prop179 (#3972).
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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4390>
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