[tor-bugs] #1297 [Tor Hidden Services]: Update hidden service logic to be more resilient to timeout

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#1297: Update hidden service logic to be more resilient to timeout
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    Reporter:  mikeperry            |       Owner:  rransom           
        Type:  defect               |      Status:  assigned          
    Priority:  major                |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
   Component:  Tor Hidden Services  |     Version:  0.2.2.10-alpha    
  Resolution:  None                 |    Keywords:                    
      Parent:  #2552                |      Points:                    
Actualpoints:                       |  
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Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:7 rransom]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 Sebastian]:
 > > Something I've experience myself was that occasionally a hidden
 service would take 120 seconds to time out, but a new request would very
 quickly succeed.
 >
 > This problem is on the client side, not the server side (which this
 ticket's description focuses on).  The client spends its pre-built
 general-purpose circuits somehow (possibly on the descriptor fetch,
 possibly on introduction or rendezvous circuits which immediately time out
 (I haven't dug thoroughly enough into the source to find out whether this
 happens yet)),

 From `circuit_launch_by_extend_info`, if `circ` is being cannibalized:
 {{{
       /* reset the birth date of this circ, else expire_building
        * will see it and think it's been trying to build since it
        * began. */
       tor_gettimeofday(&circ->_base.timestamp_created);
 }}}
 So intro and rend circuits do not die immediately after they are obtained
 through cannibalism.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1297#comment:9>
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