[tor-bugs] #3049 [Tor Client]: Allow a Tor process to be ‘owned’ by a controller process

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Mon May 23 04:59:51 UTC 2011


#3049: Allow a Tor process to be ‘owned’ by a controller process
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  rransom      |          Owner:  rransom           
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  major        |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component:  Tor Client   |        Version:                    
 Keywords:               |         Parent:                    
   Points:               |   Actualpoints:                    
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:20 nickm]:
 > I still like it.  One thing -- is it right for there to be more than one
 "owning" controller at a time?  The "ownership" metaphor implies
 exclusivity, but the TAKEOWNERSHIP command doesn't seem to prevent an
 arbitrary number of controllers from having "ownership" at the same time.
 I think that's not an unreasonable thing to do, but we sure want to
 document it, and document how TAKEOWNERSHIP interacts with
 __OwningControllerProcess: Otherwise somebody will get surprised.

 I've pushed further explanation of the behaviour of TAKEOWNERSHIP on
 multiple control connections and the intended use of these features to my
 torspec feature3049 branch, along with two `fixup!` commits to document
 these features as ‘added in 0.2.2.28-beta’ (since it seems they will be
 added in the next release).

 > Also, I think we ought to have a way to relinquish ownership, though
 that can be another patch.

 That does seem proper, even though I have no good use for that in mind.
 (I wouldn't want a controller to set TAKEOWNERSHIP if it will want a Tor
 process to outlive it.)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3049#comment:21>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list