[tor-bugs] #2697 [Torflow]: Detect exit nodes running 'transparent' HTTP proxies

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#2697: Detect exit nodes running 'transparent' HTTP proxies
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 Reporter:  rransom      |          Owner:  mikeperry
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new      
 Priority:  critical     |      Milestone:           
Component:  Torflow      |        Version:           
 Keywords:               |         Parent:           
   Points:               |   Actualpoints:           
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Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:1 mikeperry]:
 > Do we want to automatically BadExit all nodes running upstream
 transproxies?

 If we detect them, yes.

 The techniques I described above will only detect proxies that are
 noticeably mangling user traffic.

 > We already do detect censorship of exploit info by AV systems. We can
 try to focus this by running an exit scanner specifically scraping
 computer security and exploit related search queries. That would probably
 get anyone running a dumb IDS censor like snort.

 That sounds like a Good Thing to add to the exit scanner (if it's not
 there already), but I would also like to detect exit nodes that are (for
 example) accidentally censoring or redirecting traffic as a side effect of
 running an HTTP request logger and/or password sniffer.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2697#comment:3>
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