[tor-bugs] #3375 [Tor Client]: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits

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#3375: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
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 Reporter:  rransom     |          Owner:  rransom           
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  major       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.1.x-final
Component:  Tor Client  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:              |         Parent:                    
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:7 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 rransom]:
 > > Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > > > Is changing circuit_is_acceptable sufficient?  That is, will the
 having this circuit present but non-usable cause new introduction attempts
 to be made correctly, or will new attempts to connect to the hidden
 service fail while it's around?
 > >
 > > When I tested this patch, a new attempt to connect to a hidden service
 after NEWNYM succeeded (in refetching the descriptor, reintroducing to the
 HS, and building and using a second rendezvous circuit).
 >
 > Did you test it with a stream open during the newnym?

 Yes.  I opened one stream to an IRC hidden service, sent `SIGNAL NEWNYM`
 to the control port, and then opened another stream to the same hidden
 service; I read the control-port event logs produced by `SETEVENTS SIGNAL
 STREAM CIRC` carefully, and then verified that I had two circuits open to
 the same hidden service using `GETINFO circuit-status`.

 I also performed the same test without this patch, and that version of Tor
 sent the stream opened after `NEWNYM` over the previously existing
 rendezvous circuit (and did not build a second rendezvous circuit).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3375#comment:8>
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