[tor-bugs] #3354 [Vidalia]: tor's auto bridge default and unintended Vidalia side effects

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#3354: tor's auto bridge default and unintended Vidalia side effects
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 Reporter:  erinn    |          Owner:  chiiph         
     Type:  defect   |         Status:  needs_review   
 Priority:  blocker  |      Milestone:  Vidalia: 0.2.13
Component:  Vidalia  |        Version:  Vidalia: 0.2.12
 Keywords:           |         Parent:                 
   Points:           |   Actualpoints:                 
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Comment(by arma):

 Replying to [comment:16 arma]:
 > B) I wonder if we should resolve this issue by backing the "feature" out
 of Tor
 [...]
 > I don't actually remember how [Tails] intended to deploy their hack.

 I'm imagining a config option like __DontTouchNetwork=1 that you can stick
 on the commandline when you launch Tor. Then later you can turn it off
 when everything is configured as desired.

 The benefit there is that you, the packager, can make sure that the config
 option only gets set when Tor is bundled with other components that know
 how to do the hack you're doing.

 The way we've set it up now, people upgrading from a certain combination
 of components and configs automatically enable the hack. That's not nice.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3354#comment:18>
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