[tor-bugs] #3541 [Tor Client]: Decide on prop171 isolation properties for tunneled dir conns, controller-launched resolves

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Thu Jul 7 16:31:09 UTC 2011


#3541: Decide on prop171 isolation properties for tunneled dir conns, controller-
launched resolves
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  nickm       |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  normal      |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Client  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:              |         Parent:  #1865             
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:                    
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Proposal 171 specifies the right way to isolate streams that arrive over
 (socks/trans/natd/dns)port.  But there are streams that originate inside
 Tor.  Specifically, these are resolve requests launched by the controller,
 and tunneled directory connections.

 As it stands, we already set '''some''' of their isolation fields, but not
 all. In particular, tunneled directory connections have:

   * ClientAddr set to unspec
   * DestPort set to the directory port
   * DestAddr set to the directory's IP
   * ClientProtocol set to (0,0), which matches no client connection
   * SocksAuth unset.
   * SessionGroup set to 0.
   * NymEpoch unset.
   * No isolation flags set.

 and controller-launched dns connections have:

   * ClientAddr unset.
   * DestPort unset
   * DestAddr set to the thing we'reresolving.
   * ClientProtocol set to (0,0), which matches no client connection
   * SocksAuth unset.
   * SessionGroup set to 0.
   * NymEpoch unset.
   * No isolation flags set.

 Some of these are reasonable; some are not.  We need to decide which are
 which.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3541>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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