[tor-bugs] #2286 [Tor Directory Authority]: We still use self-published relay bandwidth sometimes

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#2286: We still use self-published relay bandwidth sometimes
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 Reporter:  arma                     |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect                   |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  major                    |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Directory Authority  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:                           |         Parent:                    
   Points:                           |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by karsten):

 Replying to [ticket:2286 arma]:
 > (Actually, this bug isn't quite as bad as it could be, since you need to
 be around for 3 or 5 days in order to get the Guard flag. I wonder how
 quickly measurements are ready in general, i.e. who wins the race here.)

 I think the time for a new relay to get the Guard flag is more like 16
 days (or 8 days Weighted Time).  Here are the revised requirements from
 dir-spec.txt:

 "A router is a possible ‘Guard’ [if it is ‘familiar’,] if its Weighted
 Fractional Uptime is at least the median for ‘familiar’ active routers [or
 its Weighted Fractional Uptime is at least 98 %], and if its [advertised]
 bandwidth is at least median [of all active routers] or at least 250KB/s.
 [...] A node is ‘familiar’ if 1/8 of all active nodes have appeared more
 recently than it, or it has been around for [a weighted time of 8 days]."

 See pages 2 and 3 of [https://metrics.torproject.org/papers/relay-
 stability-2011-06-30.pdf An Analysis of Tor Relay Stability].

 Of course, a relay could show up for a few hours without being measured,
 disappear for 16 days, and come back with a huge advertised bandwidth that
 we'll have to believe, because we don't have measurements.  Not sure how
 the bandwidth scanners would handle that case.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2286#comment:4>
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