[tor-bugs] #2352 [Tor Client]: more size_t_ceiling fun

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2352: more size_t_ceiling fun
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma        |       Owner:                    
     Type:  defect      |      Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  normal      |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component:  Tor Client  |     Version:                    
 Keywords:              |      Parent:                    
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------

Comment(by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > While changes for crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(): seems like
 BIO_new_mem_buf() returns NULL if memory out or something broken, and
 PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey() does not like it.

 > Seems like Tor do not checks a pointers returned by openssl, like
 BIO_new(). And calling with it openssl's funcs. It's another bug of
 course.

 > Memory out is not a reson to segfault, btw. So better to check, and
 assert correctly inside Tor's malloc.

 That was wrong statement, at least for PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(). Not
 so obvious but it can check and recover if it was NULL.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2352#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online