[tor-bugs] #2317 [Tor Client]: Missing sanity checks for cbtnummodes consensus parameter

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#2317: Missing sanity checks for cbtnummodes consensus parameter
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 Reporter:  Sebastian   |       Owner:                    
     Type:  defect      |      Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  major       |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.1.x-final
Component:  Tor Client  |     Version:                    
 Keywords:              |      Parent:                    
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Comment(by arma):

 Replying to [comment:14 Sebastian]:
 > I think we can still warn, because the values are always dependant on
 the consensus (and nothing else) as far as I can see. Can you clarify your
 first comment?

 In general, we should be looking at two different questions here: first,
 are we getting a value that will cause overflows or otherwise threaten the
 stability or security of the Tor process? Second, are we getting a value
 that will cause weird or not-presently-expected behavior.

 We should focus on the first question. If we enforce constraints for the
 second, we should be as liberal as we can -- part of the point of putting
 the value in the consensus is so we can change the value in the consensus
 and automatically change the behavior of Tors.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2317#comment:16>
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