[tor-bugs] #1074 [Tor Client]: Tor sends clock_skew status event warn too liberally

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#1074: Tor sends clock_skew status event warn too liberally
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    Reporter:  arma        |       Owner:  AltF4           
        Type:  defect      |      Status:  needs_review    
    Priority:  minor       |   Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
   Component:  Tor Client  |     Version:  0.2.1.19        
  Resolution:  None        |    Keywords:                  
      Parent:              |      Points:                  
Actualpoints:              |  
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Comment(by nickm):

 The "tor_addr_from_ipv4n" part looks wrong: the n at the end means that
 the input IPv4 address is in network order, but I am 99% sure that the one
 in routersatus_t.addr is in host order (so tor_addr_from_ipv4h would be
 appropriate).  Also, if you're going to do a connection_or_connect(), the
 third parameter needs to be identity digest (the hash of the public key of
 the host you're connecting to), rather than the descriptor digest (the
 hash of the descriptor you have for that host).

 It looks like we only do "received_netinfo_from_trusted_dir = 2" if we get
 a netinfo from an authority *and* it's not very skewed.  Is that right?

 This is a decent first step: I wonder if we can merge this with the skew
 detection from authenticated Http to directory servers, and I also think
 we should switch the logic to use a timeout rather than a simple "have we
 ever checked" flag.  But this is the perfect being the enemy of the good:
 once the above stuff is fixed, the patch is probably mergeable.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1074#comment:15>
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