[tor-bugs] #2553 [Tor Client]: tor2web mode for accessing hidden services

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Mon Feb 14 10:07:49 UTC 2011


#2553: tor2web mode for accessing hidden services
--------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
  Reporter:  arma         |              Owner:       
      Type:  enhancement  |             Status:  new  
  Priority:  normal       |          Milestone:       
 Component:  Tor Client   |            Version:       
  Keywords:               |             Parent:  #2552
    Points:               |   Actualpointsdone:       
Pointsdone:               |       Actualpoints:       
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 When the Tor client accesses a hidden service, it makes sure to get
 anonymity on its side, and the hidden service makes sure to get anonymity
 on its side.

 How much of the crappy reachability properties for hidden services is due
 to the client-side circuits?

 We should design a mode where the client either uses a one-hop rendezvous
 path, or uses itself as the rendezvous point. (We could imagine leaving
 alone the 3-hop circuit to fetch the rendezvous descriptor and the 3-hop
 circuit to reach the introduction point, on the theory that they're not
 critical-path once the connection is established; or we could ponder
 cutting them down some too on the theory that connection establishment
 *is* the critical path.)

 Should be a new config option and a few changes to various constants. How
 could it go wrong? :)

 Once we have it working, we should set up an alternate hidserv torperf (a
 la #1944) to see how the designs compare.

 Once we have some answers, we'll want to ponder if this is really
 something we want to leave in for arbitrary users to shoot themselves in
 the foot with (cf attractive nuisance).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2553>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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