[tor-bugs] #2510 [Tor Client]: bridge users who configure the non-canonical address of a bridge switch to its canonical address

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Tue Feb 8 08:09:29 UTC 2011


#2510: bridge users who configure the non-canonical address of a bridge switch to
its canonical address
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma        |       Owner:                    
     Type:  defect      |      Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  major       |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component:  Tor Client  |     Version:                    
 Keywords:              |      Points:                    
   Parent:              |  
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
Changes (by arma):

  * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I can imagine two fixes here. Option one is to rewrite the addr:port info
 in the routerinfo when you get it, so your Tor keeps thinking of that
 bridge in terms of the address and port that you configured.

 Option two is to add a second bridge entry for the new addr:port. That
 would be more robust in that you'd be more likely to connect (it could
 handle cases where the bridge stops being reachable on the address you've
 configured, but continues to be reachable on its canonical address), but
 it is also dangerous in a situation where the canonical address is known
 and somebody watches for connections to it.

 The bug2510 branch in my arma implements option one. It's on maint-0.2.2,
 but should apply cleanly to maint-0.2.1 if we choose to cherry-pick it
 back, and should apply straightforwardly (though maybe not cleanly) to
 master.

 One downside of 'option one' in the context of master is that we're
 modifying an element of routerinfo_t, and I think your abstraction really
 wants us to only be modifying elements of node_t (but node_t doesn't have
 addr or port in it).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2510#comment:1>
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