[tor-bugs] #4655 [Tor Hidden Services]: Try clearing stream-isolation state on newly opened rendezvous circs

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Wed Dec 7 03:29:26 UTC 2011


#4655: Try clearing stream-isolation state on newly opened rendezvous circs
---------------------------------+------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  rransom              |          Owner:  rransom           
     Type:  defect               |         Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  minor                |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Hidden Services  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:                       |         Parent:                    
   Points:                       |   Actualpoints:                    
---------------------------------+------------------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > Looks okay to me.
 >
 > Should the "XXXX023 This is a pretty brute-force approach" comment die?

 Yes.  The only way to avoid trying to attach all streams to circuits there
 is to keep a list of streams intended to connect to that circuit's hidden
 service; the efficiency gain there is not worth the added complexity all
 over.  I've pushed a commit to remove the comment.

 > And should the connection_ap_attach_pending() calls in
 circuit_try_attaching_streams() get a similar comment?

 No.  For general-purpose circuits, we must try to attach all streams to
 circuits.

 > (Also, because I know you sometimes share my penchant for pedantry, you
 might in the future consider that "return non-zero if X" is a less bullet-
 proof function specification than "return non-zero iff X".  But it's also
 okay to leave it as "if", and assume that everybody who cares will assume
 you meant "iff".)

 Oops.  It definitely should be “iff”.  I've pushed a fixup commit for
 this.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4655#comment:3>
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