[tor-bugs] #2667 [Tor Relay]: Exits should block reentry into the tor network

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#2667: Exits should block reentry into the tor network
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 Reporter:  mikeperry  |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect     |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  major      |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Relay  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:             |         Parent:  #2664             
   Points:             |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by arma):

 I started out thinking that the "exits should block connections back into
 the network" was a great idea, but the "bridges should refuse connections
 from exits" was a poor idea since it prevents people sharing an IP address
 with an exit relay from using bridges.

 But on further thought, I think that's an acceptable tradeoff: if you're
 the sort of place that needs a bridge, hopefully you're not the sort of
 place that runs an exit.

 This gets messier when we think about the concrete example of Syria
 though. We have a lot of users in Syria, and some of them click 'share'
 sometimes. We plan to make it easier to badexit those relays (#4207). But
 bridges in this case should ignore the badexit flag when deciding whether
 to hang up on a connection from an exit relay's IP address. So you can't
 use a bridge if the guy sitting near you in the Internet cafe three hours
 ago clicked 'share'? That's sad.

 Also, I note that multihomed exits are another unhandled edge case here.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2667#comment:8>
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