[tor-bugs] #3678 [Tor Client]: Disallow more than one relay per country in a circuit

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Wed Aug 3 15:30:59 UTC 2011


#3678: Disallow more than one relay per country in a circuit
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 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |          Owner:                   
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  major        |      Milestone:                   
Component:  Tor Client   |        Version:                   
 Keywords:               |         Parent:                   
   Points:               |   Actualpoints:                   
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Comment(by cypherpunks):

 It was unclear whether in the last comment "[w]hy is there not more
 research done on this level?" meant that the commenter was unaware of what
 research there is, or if s/he was wishing for more (one of the many areas
 needing more). Here are some of the research papers in this area, in
 reverse order of appearance. All are available at
 http://freehaven.net/anonbib/
 "AS-awareness in Tor path selection"
 "Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries"
 "Location Diversity in Anonymity Networks"

 On the general difficulty of picking routes when some nodes are trusted
 more than others, see
 "More Anonymous Onion Routing Through Trust" which is apparently not on
 anonbib, but
 can be found at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~ajohnson/
 There is also a paper addressing trust in routing more generally to appear
 in the next ACM CCS "Trust-based Anonymous Communication: Adversary Models
 and Routing Algorithms"

 HTH,
 Paul (Yes, 3 of 5 of the above-mentioned papers are mine. Somebody with a
 different background bias will no doubt be able to mention others.)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3678#comment:9>
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