[tor-bugs] #2876 [Tor bundles/installation]: Enable arbitrary delays on keypress event delivery in TorBrowser

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#2876: Enable arbitrary delays on keypress event delivery in TorBrowser
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 Reporter:  mikeperry                 |          Owner:  mikeperry
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  new      
 Priority:  normal                    |      Milestone:           
Component:  Tor bundles/installation  |        Version:           
 Keywords:                            |         Parent:  #2871    
   Points:                            |   Actualpoints:           
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Comment(by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > Round-to-the-nearest-N-msec would probably obfuscate better than add-a
 -random-delay.  (IOW, like a timed mix, but without reordering.)

 Yeah, probably. Then the fingerprinting code would always see only bins of
 dwell time and bins of flight time. Certainly easier to reason about how
 effective it is than some crazy probability distribution, at least.
 Ideally, we'd make the bin width such that they end up with uniform
 person-density in them, which means we'd need stats on the avg dwell and
 avg pairwise flight time.

 > I wonder if we can get source code out of academics doing this attack,
 and see how well our approaches normalize cadence.  It'd probably be an
 easy publication, if anybody's interested.

 Possibly. In my experience, getting source code out of academics is like
 pulling teeth. It is one of the reasons I left academia. No one wants you
 to actually try to reproduce their results... But if we could manage to
 find someone willing to give us an implementation to test against, I am
 all for it.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2876#comment:3>
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