[tor-bugs] #2866 [Metrics]: Analyze bridges in the "reserved" bucket

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Thu Apr 7 15:27:38 UTC 2011


#2866: Analyze bridges in the "reserved" bucket
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 Reporter:  karsten  |          Owner:  karsten
     Type:  task     |         Status:  new    
 Priority:  normal   |      Milestone:         
Component:  Metrics  |        Version:         
 Keywords:           |         Parent:         
   Points:           |   Actualpoints:         
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 I'm interested in learning whether keeping a certain fraction of bridges
 unassigned, that is not distributing them via email or HTTP, is a good
 idea. AIUI, the idea was to have a small set of fresh bridges in case we
 come up with a new distribution channel or want to give out fresh bridges
 manually. This idea might fail if people who run a bridge that ends up in
 the unallocated pool decide that their bridge is not being useful. They
 might turn off their bridge or delete their keys in order to get a new
 fingerprint and end up in another pool. If many people do so, we might
 better allocate all bridges to pools directly and start a new pool
 whenever there's a new distribution channel. Given the high churn of
 bridges, we might have a sufficient set of fresh bridges in that pool very
 soon. Also, if we want to give out bridges manually, we might give out
 bridges from the other pools which may have higher uptime than bridges in
 the unallocated pool. Allocating all bridges also means we don't have to
 explain to bridge operators why their bridge is also useful even if it
 doesn't have any users right now.

 (This description comes from #2372 where we started with the same
 question, but then focused on making the pool assignments publicly
 available.  Now that we have the assignments we can focus on this question
 again.)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2866>
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