[tor-bugs] #2205 [Tor Relay]: private network of nodes running master doesn't allow client requests to complete

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Tue Nov 30 07:45:25 UTC 2010


#2205: private network of nodes running master doesn't allow client requests to
complete
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |       Owner:                    
     Type:  defect     |      Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  major      |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Relay  |     Version:                    
 Keywords:             |      Parent:                    
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 nickm on IRC:

 > Okay, here is what I think is up, as translated from boboper via
 conversation and code
 >
 > When running in non-bufferevent mode, we'd repeatedly call tor_tls_read
 when we saw bytes on the buffer.  That's cool, but it means that we would
 call connection_process_inbuf whenever we did, even if we didn't actually
 see any bytes
 >
 > so we would wind in connection_or_process_inbuf while we were still
 renegotiating, and we would call connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb too
 early, which would clear the renegotiate_cb status of the tls, which would
 make the other code that was supposed to call the renegotiate_cb from
 inside tortls never happen.
 >
 > boboper's fix is to:
 >
 > - remove the renegotiation code from tortls.c, and have all
 configurations of Tor use the version in connection_or_process_inbuf
 >
 > - revise the code in connection.c that calls connection_process_inbuf
 for non-bufferevent SSL connections so that it only does so when data has
 arrived
 >
 > I think this approach is correct.
 >
 > It means, I think, that there is more code we can rip out as unneeded in
 0.2.3

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2205#comment:24>
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