[tor-bugs] #1880 [Tor Relay]: Enhanced Security Suggestion

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#1880: Enhanced Security Suggestion
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 Reporter:  forever  |         Type:  enhancement
   Status:  closed   |     Priority:  normal     
Milestone:           |    Component:  Tor Relay  
  Version:           |   Resolution:  not a bug  
 Keywords:           |       Parent:             
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Changes (by nickm):

  * status:  new => closed
  * resolution:  => not a bug


Comment:

 This is an open research question, and out-of-scope for the Tor
 bugtracker.  If you're interested in chasing it down, you could start with
 some of the traffic analysis and anonymity papers at
 http://freehaven.net/anonbib/ .  See also the padding-related FAQ entry at
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#Youshouldsendpaddingsoitsmoresecure.
 : the same logic applies to random delays.

 The short version is for every studied means of adding random delays or
 traffic padding to low-latency anonymity network, either it requires so
 much delay/padding that it isn't deployable for low-latency traffic on a
 volunteer-operated network, or it doesn't actually delay attackers long
 enough to be useful, or both.  Whether this is true of all traffic
 padding/delay schemes or not is an open research question.

 Also, the question about packet sizes suggests that you could take some
 time to read the spec or the design paper; both explain that Tor doesn't
 send variable-sized packets of user data.

 Closing for now: if anybody solves the research questions here and find a
 means of padding/delay that ''does'' resist attackers well on a low-
 latency network, we should reconsider.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1880#comment:1>
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