[tbb-dev] SELFRANDO_write_layout_file enabled intentionally?
yawning at schwanenlied.me
Wed May 17 10:52:01 UTC 2017
On Tue, 16 May 2017 19:45:40 -0500
Tom Ritter <tom at ritter.vg> wrote:
> On 16 May 2017 at 19:21, teor <teor2345 at gmail.com> wrote:
> > Even worse: can an exploit read this file to find out the memory
> > layout?
> > (I think the answer is: yes, but it doesn't matter, because it would
> > have to run arbitrary code to read the file. Maybe.)
> My attitude towards this, and what I requested of the selfrando team
> for Mozilla's investigation, is that the seed/layout be written to
> disk and erased from memory. An attacker who gets an information
> disclosure could steal the seed from memory otherwise and undo the
> protection. Arbitrary file reads are less common that infoleaks. (And
> we want to keep the mapping around for debugging crashes.)
`sandboxed-tor-browser` doesn't set the env var, and I don't see myself
ever setting it, because `/tmp` will get obliterated when firefox exits
Is it safe to assume that the current behavior of "not setting anything
here will result in no files getting created" will remain consistent?
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