[tbb-commits] [tor-browser-build/maint-9.5] No need for the 0.4.3.6 patch file anymore

gk at torproject.org gk at torproject.org
Sun Aug 23 19:55:25 UTC 2020


commit bad091590e3d4db6995ccfe5efa03756e5e7234f
Author: Georg Koppen <gk at torproject.org>
Date:   Sun Aug 23 19:54:50 2020 +0000

    No need for the 0.4.3.6 patch file anymore
    
    Thanks cypherpunk.
---
 ...ve-accessor-semantic-of-client-cached-obj.patch | 212 ---------------------
 1 file changed, 212 deletions(-)

diff --git a/projects/tor/0001-hs-v3-Improve-accessor-semantic-of-client-cached-obj.patch b/projects/tor/0001-hs-v3-Improve-accessor-semantic-of-client-cached-obj.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1432039..0000000
--- a/projects/tor/0001-hs-v3-Improve-accessor-semantic-of-client-cached-obj.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
-From 1810771799dd0b434ac2b5926297d64e383582e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 10:58:51 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] hs-v3: Improve accessor semantic of client cached object
-
-Add an inline helper function that indicates if the cached object contains a
-decrypted descriptor or not.
-
-The descriptor object is NULL if tor is unable to decrypt it (lacking client
-authorization) and some actions need to be done only when we have a decrypted
-object.
-
-This improves code semantic.
-
-Fixes #33458
-
-Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
----
- src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- src/test/test_hs_client.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c
-index 9cf408ca3e..44cd2505fd 100644
---- a/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c
-+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c
-@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@
- static int cached_client_descriptor_has_expired(time_t now,
-            const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *cached_desc);
- 
-+/** Helper function: Return true iff the cache entry has a decrypted
-+ * descriptor.
-+ *
-+ * A NULL desc object in the entry means that we were not able to decrypt the
-+ * descriptor because we are likely lacking client authorization.  It is still
-+ * a valid entry but some operations can't be done without the decrypted
-+ * descriptor thus this function MUST be used to safe guard access to the
-+ * decrypted desc object. */
-+static inline bool
-+entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *entry)
-+{
-+  tor_assert(entry);
-+  return (entry->desc != NULL);
-+}
-+
- /********************** Directory HS cache ******************/
- 
- /** Directory descriptor cache. Map indexed by blinded key. */
-@@ -341,8 +356,23 @@ static digest256map_t *hs_cache_client_intro_state;
- static size_t
- cache_get_client_entry_size(const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *entry)
- {
--  return sizeof(*entry) +
--         strlen(entry->encoded_desc) + hs_desc_obj_size(entry->desc);
-+  size_t size = 0;
-+
-+  if (entry == NULL) {
-+    goto end;
-+  }
-+  size += sizeof(*entry);
-+
-+  if (entry->encoded_desc) {
-+    size += strlen(entry->encoded_desc);
-+  }
-+
-+  if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(entry)) {
-+    size += hs_desc_obj_size(entry->desc);
-+  }
-+
-+ end:
-+  return size;
- }
- 
- /** Remove a given descriptor from our cache. */
-@@ -659,14 +689,20 @@ cache_store_as_client(hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *client_desc)
-    * client authorization. */
-   cache_entry = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(client_desc->key.pubkey);
-   if (cache_entry != NULL) {
--    /* Signalling an undecrypted descriptor. We'll always replace the one we
--     * have with the new one just fetched. */
--    if (cache_entry->desc == NULL) {
-+    /* If the current or the new cache entry don't have a decrypted descriptor
-+     * (missing client authorization), we always replace the current one with
-+     * the new one. Reason is that we can't inspect the revision counter
-+     * within the plaintext data so we blindly replace. */
-+    if (!entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cache_entry) ||
-+        !entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(client_desc)) {
-       remove_v3_desc_as_client(cache_entry);
-       cache_client_desc_free(cache_entry);
-       goto store;
-     }
- 
-+    /* From this point on, we know that the decrypted descriptor is in the
-+     * current entry and new object thus safe to access. */
-+
-     /* If we have an entry in our cache that has a revision counter greater
-      * than the one we just fetched, discard the one we fetched. */
-     if (cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter >
-@@ -740,11 +776,15 @@ cache_clean_v3_as_client(time_t now)
-     MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
-     entry_size = cache_get_client_entry_size(entry);
-     bytes_removed += entry_size;
-+
-     /* We just removed an old descriptor. We need to close all intro circuits
--     * so we don't have leftovers that can be selected while lacking a
--     * descriptor. We leave the rendezvous circuits opened because they could
--     * be in use. */
--    hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(entry->desc);
-+     * if the descriptor is decrypted so we don't have leftovers that can be
-+     * selected while lacking a descriptor. Circuits are selected by intro
-+     * authentication key thus we need the descriptor. We leave the rendezvous
-+     * circuits opened because they could be in use. */
-+    if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(entry)) {
-+      hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(entry->desc);
-+    }
-     /* Entry is not in the cache anymore, destroy it. */
-     cache_client_desc_free(entry);
-     /* Update our OOM. We didn't use the remove() function because we are in
-@@ -793,7 +833,7 @@ hs_cache_lookup_as_client(const ed25519_public_key_t *key)
-   tor_assert(key);
- 
-   cached_desc = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(key->pubkey);
--  if (cached_desc && cached_desc->desc) {
-+  if (cached_desc && entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) {
-     return cached_desc->desc;
-   }
- 
-@@ -866,7 +906,7 @@ hs_cache_remove_as_client(const ed25519_public_key_t *key)
-   /* If we have a decrypted/decoded descriptor, attempt to close its
-    * introduction circuit(s). We shouldn't have circuit(s) without a
-    * descriptor else it will lead to a failure. */
--  if (cached_desc->desc) {
-+  if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) {
-     hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(cached_desc->desc);
-   }
-   /* Remove and free. */
-@@ -995,7 +1035,7 @@ hs_cache_client_new_auth_parse(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk)
-   }
- 
-   cached_desc = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(service_pk->pubkey);
--  if (cached_desc == NULL || cached_desc->desc != NULL) {
-+  if (cached_desc == NULL || entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) {
-     /* No entry for that service or the descriptor is already decoded. */
-     goto end;
-   }
-diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_client.c b/src/test/test_hs_client.c
-index 5f7fe9c404..bff71d2645 100644
---- a/src/test/test_hs_client.c
-+++ b/src/test/test_hs_client.c
-@@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ test_close_intro_circuits_new_desc(void *arg)
-   (void) arg;
- 
-   hs_init();
-+  rend_cache_init();
- 
-   /* This is needed because of the client cache expiration timestamp is based
-    * on having a consensus. See cached_client_descriptor_has_expired(). */
-@@ -989,6 +990,51 @@ test_close_intro_circuits_new_desc(void *arg)
-   circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
-   ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
- 
-+  /* Build a descriptor _without_ client authorization and thus not
-+   * decryptable. Make sure the close circuit code path is not triggered. */
-+  {
-+    char *desc_encoded = NULL;
-+    uint8_t descriptor_cookie[HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN];
-+    curve25519_keypair_t client_kp;
-+    hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
-+
-+    tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, curve25519_keypair_generate(&client_kp, 0));
-+    crypto_rand((char *) descriptor_cookie, sizeof(descriptor_cookie));
-+
-+    desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_client_auth(descriptor_cookie,
-+                                                    &client_kp.pubkey,
-+                                                    &service_kp);
-+    tt_assert(desc);
-+    ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &service_kp, descriptor_cookie,
-+                                    &desc_encoded);
-+    tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-+    /* Associate descriptor intro key with the dummy circuit. */
-+    const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip =
-+      smartlist_get(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, 0);
-+    tt_assert(ip);
-+    ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey);
-+    ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ocirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
-+                        &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key);
-+    hs_descriptor_free(desc);
-+    tt_assert(desc_encoded);
-+    /* Put it in the cache. Should not be decrypted since the client
-+     * authorization creds were not added to the global map. */
-+    ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(desc_encoded, &service_kp.pubkey);
-+    tor_free(desc_encoded);
-+    tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_NEED_CLIENT_AUTH);
-+
-+    /* Clean cache with a future timestamp. It will trigger the clean up and
-+     * attempt to close the circuit but only if the descriptor is decryptable.
-+     * Cache object should be removed and circuit untouched. */
-+    hs_cache_clean_as_client(mock_ns.valid_after + (60 * 60 * 24));
-+    tt_assert(!hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey));
-+
-+    /* Make sure the circuit still there. */
-+    tt_assert(circuit_get_next_intro_circ(NULL, true));
-+    /* Get rid of the ident, it will be replaced in the next tests. */
-+    hs_ident_circuit_free(ocirc->hs_ident);
-+  }
-+
-   /* Build the first descriptor and cache it. */
-   {
-     char *encoded;
--- 
-2.20.1
-



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